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State Department review completed

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## 1. POLES RALLY TO SUPPORT GOMULKA

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Widespread popular support for Gomulka has been publicly expressed throughout Poland in the wake of his reported defiance of the Kremlin. Rallies, especially of youth groups, have demonstrated the popular enthusiasm for Gomulka and his program of continued liberalization. Some meetings called for the ouster of General Witasewski, political commissar of the Polish armed forces, and Wiktor Klosiewicz, head of the Polish trade unions, as well as other leaders identified with the pro-Soviet

elements of the Polish hierarchy. A rally at the military technical academy in Warsaw attended by officers, soldiers, students and workers stressed the unbreakable unity of the soldiers, the working class, and the nation. Other rallies condemned anti-Semitism and anti-intellectualism.

However, the regime has reaffirmed its friendship with the USSR and its solidarity with other socialist states. Trybuna Ludu, organ of the Polish central committee, has carried an editorial warning Western nations not to interfere in internal Polish affairs. It reaffirmed the Polish-Soviet alliance as the cornerstone of Polish policy and added that democratization of internal life and further political and economic reforms do not mean a departure from socialism or a weakening of solidarity with other socialist countries. An attempt to turn a Krakow student rally into an anti-Soviet demonstration was defeated, according to Warsaw radio.

The American embassy in London reports that developments in Poland have produced a "terrific impact on the Poles in exile" and that even the most anti-Communist among them do not conceal their pride as anti-Russian patriots. General Anders, leader of the Poles in exile, remarked to a friend, "What a courageous little man Gomulka is."

## 2. COMMUNIST REACTION TO POLISH DEVELOPMENTS

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Yugoslavia and one Soviet Satellite-- Hungary--have come out openly in favor of the new and independent Polish regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka.

Communist China has taken no public position on developments in Poland, but Gomulka has reportedly received a telegram of congratulations for his appointment as Polish party first secretary from Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung.

The official organ of the American Communist Party has lined up in support of Poland. The Hungarian party, which has remained only a step behind Poland in liberalization, undoubtedly feels that Gomulka's return facilitates its own drive for "democratization and independence." Nationalist-inclined student and writers' groups in Hungary, already restive and making demands on the regime, are stepping up their proliberalization, proindependence agitation. Hungary's counterpart to Gomulka, ex-premier Imre Nagy, seems certain to return to power.

The Yugoslavs have devoted heavy and enthusiastic coverage to the Polish events. They have given full play to the Polish replies to the Pravda attacks and restated the Trybuna Ludu comment that these discussions are not "anti-Soviet attacks" but efforts to develop a friendship on the "principles of equality, sovereignty, and genuine brotherhood."

In their press coverage of the Polish developments, the East German, Czechoslovakian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian parties have adopted the entire Soviet line and have featured Pravda's blast at the Polish press. Dissidence in Czechoslovakia, which flared during the spring but which has been extinguished by the heavy hand of the Moscow-oriented Czech regime, may, however, be rekindled by the fast-moving events in Poland and Hungary.

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#### 4. FRENCH SEIZE FIVE ALGERIAN REBEL LEADERS

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
The capture of five Algerian rebel leaders by the French on 22 October, while giving the French an immediate advantage over the nationalist movement in Algeria, will add new complications to France's relationship with Tunisia and Morocco. The Tunisian government has already protested the arrests and reportedly has warned that the action has "produced a situation approaching war."

The five leaders, among them Mohamed ben Bella, have long been sought by the French. Most of them have lived in Egypt in recent years. They were on their way from Rabat, Morocco, where they had conferred with Sultan Mohamed ben Youssef, to Tunis, to participate in further conversations between the sultan and Premier Habib Bourghiba. Their plane apparently was intercepted over the Mediterranean and forced to land at Algiers.

The French can be expected to play up the arrests in their efforts to pacify Algeria. However, the real leaders of the resistance movement are believed to be inside Algeria and probably are not among the five arrested. Algerian resistance is likely to increase, and the chances of a negotiated settlement have been further reduced. The French may try to induce Ben Bella to indicate the basis on which negotiations might be undertaken with resistance leaders inside Algeria.

The cabinet met in Paris early on 23 October to consider the situation.

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## 5. JORDAN'S LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS

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The elections for Jordan's 40-seat Lower House on 21 October strengthened the position of extreme nationalists on both the left and the right. Anti-Western candidates are reported to have captured more than half of the seats, and the majority of those elected advocates abrogation or modification of the Anglo-

Jordanian Treaty. Less than half of the 400,000 Jordanians who were eligible actually voted in the elections, which passed without incident.

The moderately anti-West National Socialists have emerged as the largest single party with at least 10 seats. The pro-Communist "National Bloc" coalition won at least three seats, giving the extreme left its strongest parliamentary position in any Arab state. The leftist, pro-Egyptian Arab Resurrection Party, which was the most active in the campaign, won two seats. The far right is represented by two supporters each of the Moslem Brotherhood and the Liberation Party. The largest bloc of seats continues to be held by independents most of whom are anti-Western.

The new parliament is to convene on 25 October. King Hussain has been urged by conservative interests to dissolve the legislature if he should find its actions objectionable, to suspend the constitution and establish an authoritarian regime. Such a move could provoke serious unrest and threaten the position of the monarchy.

The election was hailed by the Egyptian press and radio as a victory for Arab unity and a defeat for Britain and Iraq. Egypt mounted a major propaganda effort to impress the Jordanian public before the election, and will send General Amer, commander of Arab joint forces, to Amman this week to conclude a military pact.

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## 6. PROSPECTS OF THE NEW MILITARY JUNTA IN HONDURAS

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The military junta which seized the Honduran government on 21 October condemned the "shameful" acts of the ousted Lozano regime and pledged itself to transfer power after "a short time" to a civilian government representing "true democracy, peace and justice."

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the junta has already nullified the 7 October constituent assembly election, which the former regime had won by force and fraud.

The members of the junta, General Roque Rodriguez, air force chief Colonel Hector Caraccioli, and Major Roberto Galvez, probably acted mainly from patriotic motives. Ex-president Juan Manuel Galvez, the father of Roberto Galvez, retains the loyalty of top army and air force officers and will probably be an important behind-the-scenes figure. The cabinet chosen by the junta contains respected and capable men, including at least one member of the opposition Liberal Party.

In attempting to oversee the return to constitutional government, in abeyance for almost two years, the junta will face the same dilemma which bedeviled its predecessor--a free election would probably mean victory for the Liberal Party. The Liberals, out of power for over 20 years, are distrusted by many entrenched political and military figures and there is some evidence of Communist infiltration in the party.

The junta apparently consolidated its position quickly, and immediate challenges to its authority are not expected.

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## 7. JAPANESE REACTION TO MOSCOW AGREEMENTS

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Initial Japanese reactions--as reflected in the press--to the Moscow agreements restoring diplomatic relations between Japan and the USSR are cool but acquiescent, according to Ambassa-

dor Allison. He notes that a large majority of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party executive board supports the agreements, apparently reflecting a conviction among party members that no feasible alternative is possible.

Allison observes that business leaders appear doubtful that trade with the USSR will expand significantly, but they hope for increased business with Communist China and other bloc countries. The Socialists hailed the signing of the declaration and have pledged their support for the ratification of the agreements.

### Comment

A majority of Japanese political leaders and the public probably feel the agreements Prime Minister Hatoyama has concluded are the best that could be achieved under the circumstances, and support for the accords appears sufficient to prevent a major schism in the government party. Socialist support for the Moscow agreements would assure ratification even should a considerable number of Liberal-Democrats withdraw from the party in opposition to the settlement.

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## 8. PHILIPPINE COURT RELEASES 43 HUKS

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The granting of bail to 43 former Communist rebels in a Philippine provincial court is a further setback to the government's efforts to eliminate the local Communist threat. The court's action was

based on a Supreme Court ruling in July nullifying the charges under which most of the Huks were convicted, and probably foreshadows the release of more than 100 other Huks now petitioning for bail. President Magsaysay fears the eventual release of up to 1,000 and has stated this would "put the country back where it was in 1949."

Attempts by Magsaysay and ranking military officials to force a reversal of the Supreme Court action and to tighten the laws on rebellion have tended to antagonize the Philippine Congress. Some congressmen, including the chairman of the House Committee on Anti-Filipino Activities, favor amnesty for Huks now that the threat of armed rebellion is substantially removed, and resent the army's role in non-military aspects of the anti-Communist campaign.

The release of the imprisoned Communists may substantially enhance Communist capabilities in the party's present "legal struggle," particularly should bail be extended to the former politburo leaders. Philippine security officials consider the greatest danger to be the possible encouragement of rural sympathizers, who had previously been fearful of supporting the Communist cause.

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